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STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY
HOLDERS OF CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES
Recently there has been a significant increase in the marketing
of convertible debentures.1 This may perhaps be explained by the
convertible debenture's unique combination of advantages, for it
offers both the security characteristic of a straight bond and the
growth opportunity associated with an equity investment. Typi-
cally the convertible debenture investor receives not only a fixed
periodic interest payment and the promise to pay the face value of
the debenture on a specified maturity date 2-benefits commonly
given straight bondholders-but also the convertibility feature
which enables him, at his option and under specified conditions, to
convert the debenture into another form of security, usually com-
mon stock.3 Rights provided by the law of contracts and nego-
tiable instruments protect the investor should the corporation
I The following statistics give the volume of all long-term debt securities which were
registered with the SEC in recent years. The part of this long-term debt which was issued
in convertible debentures is also listed to show its relative increase over these years.
Volume of Registered Securities
Convertible Debentures All Long-Term Debt
1965 $ 1,264,000,000 $13,720,000,000
1966 1,872,000,000 15,561,000,000
1967 4,475,000,000 21,954,000,000
1968(6 mos.) 1,342,000,000 8,938,000,000
Katzin, Financial and Legal Problems in the Use of Convertible Securities, 24 Bus. LAW
359, 359 n.2 (1969).
2 The interest rate obtainable on a convertible debenture is invariably lower than the
rate payable on a straight debt security of the same company. This interest reduc-
tion-often two percentage points or more-represents the cost of the convertibility
feature. Id. at 362.
3 Securities are normally convertible from date of issuance until maturity. In a few cases
the conversion privilege will terminate before maturity of the security, if conversion into
common stock presents a possible dilution problem which is discouraging common stock
investors. Most convertible securities are convertible on the same terms throughout their
life. For example, if convertible into common stock at $50 per share, a standard $1,000
bond would be exchanged into twenty common shares. A large number of convertible
securities, however, provide for a diminishing conversion ratio. This would mean an
increase at particular intervals in the price at which stock is to be purchased. Id. at
364-65.
For the purposes of this article it is assumed that the convertible debenture is convert-
ible into common stock of the corporation. The analysis which follows, particularly in text
accompanying notes 43-98 infra, does not necessarily apply to debentures convertible into
securities other than common stock. The term "stock" in this article means common stock.
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wrongfully disallow a conversion or fail to pay the interest or
principal properly due to the investor.4 However, this protection
is inadequate if the corporation suffers an injury which impairs the
value of the conversion option. For example, some event may
result in a significant decline in the value of the corporation's
stock, causing the value of the stock to decline, and concomitantly
decreasing the value of the conversion option. Assuming the
causative event is one which gives rise to a claim for relief, should
the corporation or its stockholders not bring an action to repair or
recompense the damage, the convertible debenture holder would
be without a remedy unless he too has the right to bring an action.
This article examines the question of whether the holder of a
convertible debenture has the right to bring a stockholder's de-
rivative action in order to protect his interest in the corporation.
This article focuses on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.
That rule provides a particularly convenient vehicle for discussing
the protective limitations which prevent abuse of the derivative
action. Analogous protective limitations exist in the statutory or
case law of most jurisdictions. Therefore the discussion here
applies equally to actions brought in the courts of many states.
Moreover, the economic and public policy arguments presented
are applicable to actions in both federal and state courts.
I. THE DERIVATIVE SUIT
The stockholder's derivative action is a creation of equity.
7 It
was developed to allow shareholders "derivatively" or "socondar-
4 See W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2695, 2728, 2745, (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1967). The debenture holder's claim to corporate assets is prior to that of a shareholder.
Thus the debenture holder must receive his interest payments before stockholders can
receive their dividends; and if a corporation declares bankruptcy, the debenture holder
must receive his principal before the stockholders receive an equity return. H. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BuSINEss ENTERPRISES § 155, at 277
(1970).
5 The convertibility feature usually allows the conversion of the debenture into a fixed
number of shares of stock. Thus if the value of the stock is less than that of the debenture
it would appear to be financially unwise to convert. If the outlook for the corporation
shows little chance of its stock's reaching a value where conversion becomes financially
worthwhile, the value of the conversion right is negligible.
6
ARIz. R. Civ. P. 23.1; CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(a) (West Supp. 1972); CoLo. R. Civ.
P. 23(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 327 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-615 (1969); IDAHO
R. Civ. P. 23(b); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45a (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-223(a)(Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 46 (1970); MINN. R. Civ. P., DIST.
CT. R. 23.06; NEV. R. Civ. P. 23(b); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6. Civ. P.R. 4:36-2
(1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(23b) (1953); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 626 (McKinney
1963); OHIo CiV. R. 23.1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 432 (1967); WASH. L. R. 23.1 (1967);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (1957).
1 Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 980 (1957).
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ily" to enforce a corporate cause of action when those managing
the corporation refuse to do so. The right which is to be enforced
belongs to the corporation. If the corporate officials refuse to
assert it, the legal remedy available to the shareholders is there-
fore inadequate, and equity allows the shareholders to assert the
action on behalf of the corporation. 8 Since the injury to be reme-
died is corporate, any recovery is paid into the corporate treasury
for the benefit of the corporation.9
Derivative suits serve an important business function. Econom-
ic expansion has created a need for increased capital, and the
public has proved a ready source of supply.10 Simultaneously
there has been an increasing separation between shareholder own-
ership and management control of the corporation.'" Augmenting
this increased separation has been the frequent use of subsidiary
corporations for doing business. 12 This has further served to cen-
tralize control apart from the investor-owner.' 3 Moreover, man-
agement has developed enhanced powers through its control of
the corporate treasury, proxy mechanism, and inside knowledge
of operations. 14 Increased separation between owners and man-
8 Because the derivative suit was "equitable" rather than "legal," it had been assumed
that there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in a derivative action. Ross v.
Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.38 [4], at 308.11 (2d ed. 1971); Note, The
Right to a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 Yale L.J. 725, 732 n.35
(1965). However, in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), rev'g 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1968), the Supreme Court held that shareholders are entitled to a jury trial if the cause of
action was one in which the corporation could have demanded a jury trial had it brought
the suit.
9 Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (ND. Iowa 1946); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23
Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.
v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909), afftd, 225 U.S. 1 I 1 (1912).
0 Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. I, 2 (1965). As
evidence of this, Berle discusses the large increase in productive property under corporate
control, the growth in the number of new shareholders, and the important role which
corporate securities play in individual wealth. See also Dykstra, The Revival of the
Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 79 (1967).
11 See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(rev. ed. 1967); Berle, supra note 10, at 4:
Most "owners" own stock, insurance savings and pension claims and the
like, and do not manage; most managers (corporate administrators) do not
own. The corporate collective holds legal title to the tangible productive
wealth of the country-for the benefit of others.
12 The shareholder of a parent corporation is one more step removed from decisions
made by the management of various subsidiaries of the parent.
13 See Painter, Double Derivative Suits and Other Remedies with Regard to Damaged
Subsidiaries, 36 IND. L.J. 143 (1961).
14 For example, management has the support of the corporate treasury and legal staff if a
derivative action is brought against it.
Voting by proxy is usually necessary in large corporations where voting shares are
widely dispersed. The proxy mechanism is used for both election of directors and share-
holder approval of various corporate matters. While it is a useful device, it also favors
management in its operation more than corporate shareholders.
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agers and expansion of management powers create a situation
conducive to abuse of ownership interests by management. 1 5 Giv-
en this situation it is important to provide the stockholder a means
by which he can protect his investment. Otherwise the stock-
holder would be personally helpless against such acts as mis-
management of the business, misappropriation of assets, or dilu-
tion of outstanding shares by the fraudulent issue of additional
shares.
There are several possible remedies to contain management
abuses. 16 First there is the possibility of voting out management.
This might be an effective remedy for small corporations, but for
many modern corporations this is unlikely in view of a large
number of uninformed or uninterested shareholders each owning
only a small portion of the total shares of the corporation. More-
over, management control of the proxy mechanism further handi-
caps the use of a voting remedy. 1 7 A second possibility is for the
shareholder to sell his stock. This is not an effective solution,
however, for either the shareholder or the corporation. The injury
to the corporation may already have had a detrimental effect on
the value of the stock by the time a shareholder learns of any
wrongdoing. Therefore, although a current sale would protect the
shareholder from future diminution of the value of his stock, he
would already have suffered a financial loss. Furthermore, the
corporation would suffer injury without any prospect of com-
pensation to its treasury. In fact, by selling his interest in the
Management selects its slate of nominees for the board, makes its recommen-
dations concerning them and any resolutions to be passed upon by the
shareholders, uses the company's funds to solicit proxies and, unless com-
pelled by statute, articles or by-laws, gives the owners whatever information
it pleases to make them cognizant of how their corporation is being run.
N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 365 (2d ed. 1971). See also A. BERLE & G.
MEANS, supra note I1, at 217: Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders,
Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STANFORD L. REV. 248 (1969);
Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970).
Shareholders may only use management's proxy solicitation materials for proposals which
are a "proper subject for action by the security holders." SEC Reg. 14A, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14 (1972). Without this limited assistance the cost of waging a proxy fight
can be extraordinarily expensive. Eisenberg, supra, at 1500 nn.49, 50.
"
5
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949). The Court
noted:
As business enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of incorporation,
management became vested with almost uncontrolled discretion in handling
other people's money. The vast aggregate of funds committed to corporate
control came to be drawn to a considerable extent from numerous and
scattered holders of small interests. The director was not subject to an
effective accouritability. That created strong temptation for managers to
profit personally at expense of their trust.
16 For a more detailed discussion, see Sullivan, The Federal Courts as an Effective
Forum in Shareholders' Derivative Actions, 22 LA. L. REV. 580 (1962).
17 See note 14 supra.
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corporation, the shareholder may encourage future injuries be-
cause the party responsible for the injury may feel immune from
accountability. Thus these two self-help remedies are of limited
value, at best. The appropriate alternative seems to lie in judicial
action. If there has been a direct injury to a shareholder's personal
rights as defined by the articles of incorporation or state law, he
can maintain a direct action against the party causing the injury.
Quite often, however, the wrong will be to the corporation and
will only indirectly affect the shareholder's rights. Hence, in this
latter event, the courts will not allow a direct action to be brought
by the shareholder. 18 The stockholder's derivative action there-
fore is a necessary and useful device by which the shareholder
can remedy his indirect loss.
The stockholder's derivative suit has been extremely useful and
undoubtedly deserves the praise which has been bestowed upon
it.19 Nevertheless, several dangers, three of which are pertinent
here, are inherent in derivative actions. First, the derivative action
18 Classification of actions as either derivative or nonderivative is sometimes very
difficult. Usually a direct or individual shareholder action (nonderivative) involves the
enforcement by a shareholder of a claim for relief based on his membership contract,
against the corporation and possibly others. It might be brought by the shareholder
individually or on behalf of himself and all other shareholders similarly situated. A
stockholder derivative action is based upon a wrong to the incorporated entity as a whole.
Quite often this involves the breach of some duty owed to the corporation. Classification
becomes difficult because of a lack of precise definition of the person or persons in whose
favor various corporate duties run. H. HENN, supra note 4, at 755-61; Comment, Dis-
tinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1147
(1962); Note, Protection of Shareholder's Rights: Derivative v. Representative Suits, 46
ILL. L. REV. 937 (1952); Note, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1952). The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that the same facts in a complaint may be capable of supporting
either a derivative action or an individual cause of action by a minority shareholder. J. i.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
19 "This remedy born of stockholder helplessness was long the chief regulator of corpo-
rate management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of
betrayal of stockholders' interests." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 548 (1949) (Jackson, J.).
In Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), Judge Rifkind noted a
number of positive achievements of derivative actions in that they: (I) provided a policing
of the corporate system; (2) educated corporate directors as to fiduciary responsibility and
loyalty; (3) encouraged full disclosure to stockholders; and (4) discouraged board member-
ship to those who are not sincerely interested in the corporation.
Dean Rostow has called the derivative suit "the most important procedure the law has
yet developed to police the internal affairs of corporations." Rostow, To Whom and for
What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY 49 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
Professor Dykstra also contends that derivative suits play an important role in our
economy. Furthermore, he shows that the judicial and legislative bodies are aware of this
and accordingly have been receptive to derivative actions. Dykstra, supra note 10, at 75,
77.
See also Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 767 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting in
part); de Capriles, Fifteen-Year Survey of Corporate Developments, 1944-1959, 13
VAND. L. REV. I, 15 (1959); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits,
47 COLUM. L. REV. I (1947). Note, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV.
171, 190-9 1 (1936).
Convertible Debentures
can be conducive to "strike suits"- speculative actions brought
by shareholders to harass a corporation for the ultimate purpose
of achieving an out-of-court settlement, resulting in indirect gain
to the plaintiff shareholders20 Litigation of derivative suits can be
quite expensive and time-consuming for corporate management.
Consequently management may be anxious to settle prospective
derivative suits even though the complaining shareholders would
be unlikely to succeed on the merits of their case. Secondly,
purchasers of stock may only be speculating in litigation or litigat-
ing purchased grievances if they buy stock motivated by the
possibility of a successful derivative suit.2 1 Finally, derivative
actions may give rise to collusive invocation of diversity jurisdic-
tion. For example, a corporation unable to bring a cause of action
into a federal court because it lacked diversity could agree with a
shareholder having the necessary diversity to bring the action on
behalf of the corporation through a shareholder's derivative suit.22
To provide a check against these possible abuses, the federal
courts have developed restrictions upon derivative actions. In the
case of Hawes v. Oakland the Supreme Court specifically laid
down requirements23 which were later adopted in Federal Equity
Rule 27,24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b), and finally the
present Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.25 These restrictions
2
°See H. HENN, supra note 4, § 359, at 752 n.22. It is generally accepted today that any
settlement recovery must go to the corporation. See note 9 supra. Thus the financial
motivation for strike suits has been reduced to the expectation that the court will allow
plaintiff's lawyer a generous fee out of any fund collected for the corporation or that the
gain to the corporate treasury will be reflected in the market value of corporate stock.
21 Purchasers might be planning on bringing the derivative action themselves for a
profitable out-of-court settlement or they might have knowledge that other shareholders
intend to bring a derivative action, which if successful would greatly increase the value of
the stock.22See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). Collusive invocation of diversity can
also be prevented by use of the doctrine of realignment of parties. See Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91 (1957).
23 104 U.S. at 460-62.24 Equity R. 27, 226 U.S. 656 (1912), read:
Every bill brought by one or more stockholders in a corporation against the
corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may properly be
asserted by the corporation, must be verified by oath, and must contain an
allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of
which he complains, or that his share had devolved on him since by operation
of law, and that the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the
United States jurisdiction of a case of which it would not otherwise have
cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff
to secure such action as he desires on the part of the managing directors or
trustees, and, if necessary, of the shareholders, and the causes of his failure
to obtain such action, or the reasons for not making such effort.
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 reads:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may proper-
ly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (I) that the
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of course apply only to actions brought in federal courts. Since
1941, however, many state legislatures have passed statutes or
issued rules of procedure which limit derivative actions. Many of
these states have patterned their procedural rules after the ap-
proach adopted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
former 23(b) and present 23.1.26
11. PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE SUIT
A. Contemporaneous Ownership
The contemporaneous ownership limitation on the share-
holder's derivative suit requires not only that plaintiff be a share-
holder at the time of suit but also that the plaintiff have been a
shareholder in the corporation at the time of the transaction of
which he complains or that his shares thereafter devolved on him
by operation of law.2 7 This requirement was originally adopted to
protect the federal courts from collusive invocation of diversity
jurisdiction by corporations seeking access to a federal forum. 28 It
has subsequently been promulgated by many state courts and
legislatures to deter "a subsequent purchaser of shares from
'speculating in litigation' or 'litigating purchased grievances.' "29
The contemporaneous ownership requirement makes litigating
purchased grievances more difficult because it would be necessary
for the subsequent purchaser to join with a party who meets the
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which
he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise
have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any,
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members,
and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the share-
holders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corpo-
ration or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the
court directs.
26 See note 6 supra.
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 reads in part:
[T]he complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains
or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of
law ....28 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881).
29 H. HENN, supra note 4, § 362, at 766. See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 601. See also
note 21 supra.
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requirement in whose name both could sue. This is possible but
arguably more difficult than suing in one's own name.3 0
Generally, the courts have broadly construed the definition of
ownership, thereby including equitable owners.3 ' At least two
states,3 2 however, have taken a much more conservative approach
in delineating a contemporaneous ownership requirement. They
have required that plaintiff prove he was a registered shareholder
at the time the wrong was committed against the corporation.
Also, the amendment to optional Section 43A of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act requires that a shareholder be "of record"
to meet the requirement of contemporaneous ownership.33 The
requirement of either registered ownership or ownership of record
provides a simple test for determining ownership for purposes of
the contemporaneous ownership test, but it can be argued that
these tests are too restrictive. One critic has pointed out that there
is little evidence that nonrecord holders who have brought deriva-
tive actions under standard contemporaneous ownership clauses
have abused this right.3 4 Thus he feels that the more restrictive
"phrases are the products either of a general hostility to derivative
suits or of an exaggerated fear of purchased litigation." 35
B. Exhaustion of Intracorporate Remedies
Another limitation requires that the plaintiff in a stockholder's
derivative action must exhaust all intracorporate remedies. He
must allege in his complaint that he has made a prior demand on
management or, when necessary, on the other shareholders or
members for the action he desires. He must also state the reason
for his failure to obtain such action or why he failed to make the
demand.3 6 This may reduce the motivation to abuse the derivative
3To escape the limitation of the contemporaneous ownership rule, some subsequent
purchasers have urged courts to accept a "continuing wrong theory." Under this theory
the wrong that has been perpetrated on the corporation is deemed continuing and it is
possible for any plaintiff who becomes a shareholder at any time during the continuation of
the wrong to sue derivatively. Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963). In Palmer,
the challenged transaction took place before plaintiff acquired his shares of stock, but the
corporation made payments under the terms of this transaction subsequent to plaintiff's
acquisition. The court ruled that plaintiff had standing to sue. In Bateson v. Magna Oil
Corp., 414 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1969), the court allowed an action by a longtime shareholder
who had inadvertently sold his shares but purchased others before suing, on the basis that
the wrong was a continuing one, and he was not estopped by his knowledge of the alleged
wrong when he purchased the later shares.
31 See notes 44-57 and accompanying text infra.
3 2 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 834 (West Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (1957).
11 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 43A (optional section) (1969).
3 4
See Dykstra, supra note 10, at 97.
3
5 id.
36 This specific requirement originated in courts of equity. The rationale was that an
exhaustion of intracorporate remedies was proof of the inadequacy of the legal remedy and
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action, for management, if the demand has merit, can sue in its
own name, thus precluding the derivative action. Moreover, if a
majority of the board of directors rejects plaintiff's demand in the
exercise of honest business judgment, the shareholder-plaintiff
may not bring a derivative action.3 7 If the shareholders as a whole
ratify the directors' alleged wrongful conduct or refusal to sue,
they thereby destroy any cause of action on the part of dissenting
shareholders, thus clearly avoiding the possibility for abuse.
38
C. Supervision by the Court
Rule 23.1 also requires that an action not be dismissed or
compromised unless the court gives its approval. The court can
direct that other shareholders be notified of any such settlement.
The requirement of court approval of a voluntary dismissal or
settlement discourages strike suits because it prevents a share-
holder from suing and settling out of court in some hidden or
secret manner. In addition, the court can prevent an out-of-court
settlement which would be unfair to the other shareholders of the
corporation. 39 Court supervision also provides a means of in-
thus justification for the equitable remedy of a derivative action. When there is hostility on
the part of management because management is the alleged wrongdoer or is under the
control of the alleged wrongdoer, the demand requirement is excused. Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91 (1957); Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957);
Reed v. Norman, 48 Cal. 2d 338, 309 P.2d 809 (1957); Meltzer v. Atlantic Research
Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.),cert. denied sub nom. Scurlock v. Meltzer, 379 U.S. 841
(1964). The requirement of a demand on shareholders must be met when the other
shareholders could effectively ratify the alleged wrong. The number of shareholders
necessary to ratify an alleged wrong can vary anywhere from a mere majority to unani-
mous shareholder approval. See Note, 32 N.D.L. REV. 125 (1956). See also Mayer v.
Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y.
113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912). The courts may show a great deal of flexibility in cases dealing
with shareholder demand, since an indiscriminate insistence on this requirement could
discourage meritorious actions. Thus in Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (Ist Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965), the court held that it would be too onerous a burden to
require the plaintiff to meet the shareholder demand requirement when the corporation
involved had 48,000 shareholders.
3 'Ash v. International Business Machines, Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966) (holding that minority stockholder lacked standing to maintain
a derivative suit against another corporation for a Clayton Act violation, in the absence of
showing that the refusal of directors to sue in corporate behalf was fraudulent or collusive
or represented anything worse than unsound business judgment honestly exercised in
corporate interest); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957) (holding that if a
majority of the board, admittedly honest and uninvolved in the alleged wrongs, refuses to
bring a suit, complaining shareholders' judgment as to the need to bring that suit cannot
replace the directors' judgment); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966)
(holding that if shareholder does not allege that directors have been guilty of some
misconduct, directors' refusal to sue falls within the business judgment rule barring
stockholder's derivative action).
38 See note 36 supra.
3 9 Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1945);
Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 39 F.
Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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suring that the payment of out-of-court settlements is to the cor-
porate treasury and not to the plaintiff. Finally, supervision pro-
vides some assurance that attorney fees are limited to a reason-
able amount.
D. Security for Expenses
Several states have enacted statutes which enable courts to
require that plaintiff-shareholders with small interests in the cor-
poration give security for corporate expenses in derivative action
litigation. 40 The first statute of this type was enacted in New
York in 1944 in reaction to the Wood Report. 4 1 Under typical
security-for-expense statutes, the court will require the
plaintiff-shareholder to post security upon demand by the corpo-
ration only if his interest in the corporation is below a certain
prescribed level. 42 Thus the plaintiff is required to bear, at least
initially, the burden of both the defendant's and his own litigation
expenses. The purpose of these statutes is to make the derivative
suit more difficult, thus discouraging frivolous or improperly moti-
vated suits which do not have substantial probabilities for suc-
cess. The rationale behind applying these statutes only to small
shareholders is the implicit assumption that the larger the share-
holder the more likely it is that he is acting in good faith. 4a
40 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-223 (1966); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 830, 834 (West Supp. 1972);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 31-4-21 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.131 (Supp. 1972); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 21-2047 (Supp. 1970); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (1969); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW, §627 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-48 (1960); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1972); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 5.14 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.460 (1965); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.405 (1957).See also ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 43A [I1 (1969).
41 The report examined 1,266 suits filed by shareholders in New York City, Kings
County, and United States District Court for the Southern District of New York during
the years 1932 to 1942. Although the report examined the costs and abuses of derivative
suits, its impact was lessened by a lack of candor and objectivity. Supposedly the report
was to suggest possible changes in law or procedure which would allow for remedying of
corporate wrongdoing while lessening the amount of groundless and costly litigation of this
type. In reality, the report became a brief on the alleged need for reducing litigation by
stockholders. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LITIGATION, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DE-
RIVATIVE SUITS (1944). See Dykstra, supra note 10, at 76. See also Hornstein, The Death
Knell of Stockholders' Derivative'Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944).
42 Representative statutes include: ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 43A (optional
section) (1969) (where plaintiffs own less than 5 percent of outstanding shares or voting
trust certificates, unless either of these has a market value in excess of $25,000); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (less than 5 percent of any class of
outstanding shares or voting trust certificates or beneficial interest in shares representing
less than 5 percent of any class of such shares, unless the market value of such interest is
in excess of $50,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (1957) (less than 3 percent of out-
standing shares of any class, with no alternative dollar amount).
43 The rationale that large shareholders are less likely to bring derivative actions invites
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E. The Shareholder Requirement
The limitations discussed above would not necessarily bar any
bondholder, corporate noteholder, or convertible debenture hold-
er from bringing a stockholder's derivative action. However, the
shareholder requirement of the contemporaneous ownership limi-
tation may present difficulties. As mentioned above, Rule 23.1
requires a plaintiff to have been a shareholder at the time of the
transaction of which he complains. 44 Thus the right of the holder
of a convertible debenture to bring a shareholder's derivative suit
will depend on how, for these purposes, the law defines share-
holder. 45 Most legislatures and courts have been inclined to con-
strue the meaning of shareholder very broadly. 46 For example, the
majority rule is that not only those who hold legal title but also
equitable owners47 of stock can bring a stockholder's derivative
action. Equitable owners allowed to bring suit have included a
stockholder who has been enjoined from voting,48 beneficiaries of
inquiry. There appears to be no evidentiary support tor the assumption that a derivative
action brought by a large shareholder is more likely to be brought in good faith or more
likely to be meritorious than an action brought by a small shareholder. Moreover, most of
the large corporations in the United States have thousands of shares outstanding and
personal interest of one shareholder is necessarily quite small despite a large recovery for
the whole corporation. Zlinkoff, The American Investor and the Constitutionality of
Section 61-b of the New York General Corporation Law, 54 YALE L.J. 352, 384-90
(1945). One possible escape for a plaintiff shareholder is to find other shareholders to join
as coplaintiffs since the sum of the equity interest can be used to meet the statutory
requirements. See Baker v. Macfadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876
(1950); Weinstein v. Behn, 68 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1947), affd mem., 272 App. Div.
1045, 75 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1947). See also Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of the New Jersey secur-
ity-for-expenses statute, N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (1969). The statute was held to
be within the police power of the state, involving no impairment of obligation of contract,
and denying neither due process of law nor equal protection of the law on the grounds that
it treated all small shareholders alike.
44 See notes 27-35 and accompanying text supra.
4 There has been much disagreement concerning whether federal or state law governs
this determination. Compare HFG Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir.
1947), in which the court held the question to be procedural, therefore to be determined
without regard to local law with Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941), in which
the court held that the issue of who is a shareholder is substantive and must be determined
by the local law of the state of incorporation. The prevailing view today is that the
question is substantive. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.17, at 23.1-154
(1969), arguing that the opinion in the HFG Co. case confused the question as to the
procedural character of the original rule 23(b) with the substantive issue of whether an
equitable owner can sue. See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1826, at 327 (1972). Thus under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), if the action is based upon substantive federal law, the court will look to federal
law to determine the meaning of shareholder. Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F.R.D. 243
(S.D.N.Y. 197 1); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1016 (1954). If the case is in federal court under the diversity jurisdiction, however,
substantive state law will be determinative. Rosenfeld v. Schwitzer Corp., 251 F. Supp.
758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
46 Dykstra, supra note 10, at 94.
47 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, at § 5976. N. LATTIN, supra note 14, at 42 1.
48 Maine Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 115 App. Div. 109, 100 N.Y.S. 709 (1906).
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stock held in trust. 9 owners of stock held on margin,50 holders of
preferred stock,5' legatees of stock who only had equitable title
thereto, 52 and pledgees of shares. 53 Justification allowing equitable
owners to bring suit has usually rested upon the equity tradition of
stockholder's derivative actions. 54 Moreover, although the corpo-
ration might reasonably require an inflexible basis of ascertaining
shareholder identity for the purposes of certain intracorporate
activities, such as payment of dividends and eligibility to vote, a
rigid definition is not required for stockholder's derivative ac-
tions.
55
A broad interpretation of the shareholder requirement is also
reflected in the fact that courts have allowed "double derivative
actions." 56 A double derivative action is invoked when the owner
of shares in a parent corporation sues a fourth party on behalf of a
subsidiary. It has been pointed out that multiple derivative actions
are also theoretically possible if there is a chain of proprietary
interest.
57
II1. THE CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURE
HOLDER AND STOCKHOLDER'S
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
A. Recent Case Law
There is remarkably little law on the question of the status of
the holder of a convertible debenture for purposes of determining
19Schlegel v. Schlegel Mfg. Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 808, 258 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1965);
Perry v. Perry, 339 Mass. 470, 160 N.E.2d 97 (1959); Hall v. O'Reilly Realty & Inv. Co.,
306 Mo. 182, 267 S.W. 407 (1924).
' Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760 (Ch. 1964); Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc. v. Saks, 35 Del. Ch. 503, 122 A.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
" Osann v. Jones, 209 App. Div. 9, 204 N.Y.S. 242 (1924).
52 Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1944).
53
Weingand v. Atlantic Savings & Loan Ass'n, I Cal. 3d 806, 464 P.2d 106, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 658 (1970); Arcola Sugar Mills Co. v. Burnham 67 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
292 U.S. 630 (1933); Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
14 As mentioned earlier, stockholder derivative actions originated in equity courts. See
note 7 supra. Equity courts were also willing to look to beneficial interests in the stock
rather than disallow the derivative action because the plaintiff was not the holder of the
legal title to the stock. See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
15 Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106, 112 (Ch. 1948). The
court apparently thought that voting, payment of dividends, and appraisal proceedings are
regular corporate activities and an inflexible list of stockholders to provide certainty was
necessary.
5 6 Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1945);
Singer v. Allied Factors, Inc., 216 Minn. 443, 13 N.W.2d 378 (1944). See also Note,
Minority Stockholders of a Subsidiary Corporation: How May They Redress Wrongs
Perpetrated on Behalf of the Parent?, 13 U. Pirr. L. REV. 358 (1952).
17 Saltzman v. Birrell, 78 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("There is no sound reason why
if a double derivative is permissible, a triple derivative should not be, and indeed, Marcus
v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, decided by the Court of Appeals of this Circuit on May 20, 1948,
tacitly assumes their validity.").
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standing in a shareholder's derivative suit. What law there is,
however, indicates that standing will be allowed. In Hoff v.
Sprayregan,58 a federal district court held:
While a convertible debenture of the kind in question is
obviously a hybrid, the interest of its holder in the corpo-
ration's stock is sufficient for our purposes to satisfy the
requirement of Rule 23. 1.5 9
While this statement seems perfectly straightforward, its prece-
dential value may be severely limited. In the first place, plaintiffs
in Sprayregan had exercised their option to convert and were,
without question, stockholders at the time of suit. As to their
status at the time of the wrongs complained of, the court held in
the alternative that the wrong continued after the time of their
exercise of conversion rights. By the court's alternative holding,
then, plaintiffs were also clearly stockholders at the time of the
wrong complained of. Thus, the decision did not rest solely on the
holding that the owners of convertible notes were stockholders for
purposes of Rule 23.1.
As to the former holding regarding the status of convertible
debenture holders, the court supported its result on two grounds.
The action was based on an alleged violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,c0 which includes convertible debentures
within its definition of "equity security"; 6 1 and the court found it
appropriate to look to the substantive law of the case in order to
determine the meaning of shareholder for procedural purposes.62
Additionally, the court relied heavily on Entel v. Guilden,63 in
which the holder of a warrant 64 had been held to be a shareholder
5852 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
59 Id. at 247. The notes in question were $22,000 worth of 6 percent convertible
subordinated debentures, convertible for a limited period of time into common stock of the
corporation at the rate of one share per seven dollars principal amount.
60 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
61 Id. § 78c(a)( 11).
6252 F.R.D. at 247. This decision can be criticized on the grounds that the term
"shareholder" in Rule 23.1 arguably has a purpose of limitation, while "equity security" in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to be broadly interpreted. Characterizations in one
statute should not necessarily be determinative out of context.
63 223 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
64 A warrant is a right to purchase a specified number of shares from a corporation for a
specified price within a given time limit. Warrants are quite often traded through a
securities exchange or over the counter, in a similar fashion to convertible debentures.
Thus warrant owners have the option of exercising the purchase right, letting it expire, or
selling it to another investor. The choice will depend upon various market considerations.
The only substantive difference between a warrant and a convertible debenture is that the
former is a pure conversion right while the latter also includes a creditor-debtor relation-
ship. See generally Vernava, Stock Options: Corporate, Regulatory and Related Tax
Aspects, 30 U. PiTT. L. REV. 197 (1968); Katzin, supra note 1; ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.




within the meaning of Rule 23.1. Entel dealt with a cause of
action arising under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 65 and
the court had found justification for its result in the "broadly
remedial" purposes of the Act.6 6 Thus, what case precedent there
is to support the Sprayregan holding seems clearly distinguishable
from Sprayregan on its facts.
Ultimately, whether the holder of a convertible debenture is
deemed to be a shareholder appears to depend substantially on
the policy considerations which the court finds to be important.
The court in Sprayregan, for example, found that none of the
policies behind the shareholder requirement of Rule 23.1 would
be frustrated by allowing the plaintiffs to sue.6 7 Yet if one views a
particular form of security as a bundle of legal rights and duties, it
seems, as indicated by the court in Entel, that courts should not
lightly go about changing the content of various bundles of legal
rights and duties, each bundle being a different "mode of in-
vestment within the corporate framework," bought and sold with
various expectation and reliance interests.
68
A situation analogous to that of the holder of convertible de-
bentures was presented in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co. 69 In
that case the stockholder of a corporation extinguished in a merg-
er was allowed to bring a derivative action on behalf of the
surviving corporation, even though he was not a record share-
holder of the surviving corporation, on the basis of his right to
exchange his stock in the extinguished corporation for stock of
the surviving operation. The court was explicit in its reasoning.
The plaintiff, because he could at any time exchange his shares,
was deemed to have an equitable interest in the stock of the
surviving corporation; and this equitable interest was sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of Rule 23.1.
It is well established, at least in federal law, that the equitable
owner of stock is entitled to bring a shareholder's derivative
action. 70 Difficulty arises in determining whether the holder of a
65 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I et seq. (1970).
66223 F. Supp. at 133.
67 52 F.R.D. at 247. The court noted
the obvious substantiality of the $22,000 investment made by the plaintiffs in
this case well before any of the events about which they sue. It is plain that
their interest in the stock of the corporation from the inception of their
investment was real and far weightier than that of a holder of, say, 100 shares
who would unquestionably be entitled to maintain the action. To allow
standing to plaintiffs like these generates no trace of the problems or evils
against which Rule 23.1 is directed.
68 223 F. Supp. at 131-32.
69435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
70 HFG Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947); See notes 47-54
and accompanying text supra.
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convertible debenture has the type of interest in the stock of the
corporation that can be called equitable ownership. The deHaas
case would seem to support such a conclusion, if only by analogy:
the right to exchange stock pursuant to a merger is arguably
similar in nature to the rights inhering in a convertible debenture.
While Sprayregan allowed the convertible debenture holder to
bring a stockholder's derivative suit, it did not directly state that
the plaintiff was an equitable owner of stock in the corporation. It
simply concluded that a convertible debenture is that type of
investment in a corporation to which it would be appropriate to
attach the right to bring a stockholder's derivative suit. The court
was obviously influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had some
sort of interest in the corporation's stock but apparently did not
find it necessary to conclude that that interest be as direct as
equitable ownership.
Indeed, some courts have explicitly held that the holder of a
convertible debenture does not have an equitable interest in the
corporation's stock. The existence of equitable ownership re-
quires the simultaneous existence of two estates in or titles to the
same subject matter: the first is legal, vested in one person, and
traditionally recognized only by courts of law; the second is
equitable, vested in another person, and traditionally recognized
only by courts of equity. 71 Certainly it could be argued that the
conversion feature of the convertible debenture results in pre-
cisely such a division of ownership, with the corporation holding
legal title to the stock while the security owner holds the equitable
title. Vesting of legal title in the security owner is contingent upon
payment of the required conversion price. An analogy can be seen
between this suggested division of ownership and that which
courts recognize when stock is held on margin by a brokerage
house.72 The few decisions on this issue, however, have refused
to recognize that the conversion feature of a bond or warrant can
give status to the holder as either a legal or equitable stock-
holder. 73 Furthermore, these cases have held that this type of
security holder's interest is purely contractual, and until he ex-
ercises his conversion rights and demands his stock he has no
7 1
J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 147 (5th ed. 1941).
72 See note 50 and accompanying text supra. In the margin account, legal title to the
stock would be held by the stockbroker, until such time as the equitable owner pays off the
loan made to him by the broker to purchase the stock.
73 Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942); Lisman v. Mil-
waukee, Lake Shore & Western Ry., 161 F. 472 (C.C. Wis. 1909); Parkinson v. West End
St. Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 (1899); Pratt v. American Bell Tel. Co., 141 Mass.




interest in the corporation as a stockholder.7 4 If a corporation
failed to convert the bonds into stock upon demand by the secur-
ity holder, a court of equity would probably refuse to give specific
performance .
75
While these cases have held the holders of convertible deben-
tures not to be equitable owners of stock, this should not be
dispositive of the question of standing to bring a stockholder's
derivative action. Most of the decisions involved attempts by
bondholders to enforce personal rights as stockholders rather than
derivative actions on behalf of the corporation. Because the
Sprayregan court, the one court which has ruled directly on the
issue in the context of the stockholder's derivative suit, did not
confine itself to technical questions of ownership and fine classifi-
cations of equitable interests, it is appropriate to consider those
policy issues which should influence a court in determining stand-
ing to bring a stockholder's derivative suit.
B. Policy Considerations
Strike suits, purchased litigation, and collusive invocation of
diversity jurisdiction all are possible dangers inherent in deriva-
tive actions. 76 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 (with its
requirements of contemporaneous ownership, 77 exhaustion of in-
tracorporate remedies, 78 and supervision by the court7 9 ), various
state statutes of a similar nature,80 and state statutes requiring
security for expenses 8' protect the system from these inherent
dangers. These rules and statutes with their numerous require-
ments would appear to be equally effective in protecting against
abuses from derivative actions brought by holders of convertible
debentures. It is not clear, however, that the shareholder require-
74 See note 73 supra. See also Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Drafts-
manship, 19CALIF. L. REV. 1,4 (1930).
75 Bratten v. Catawissa R.R., 211 Pa. 21, 60 A. 319 (1905). Pomeroy has observed:
In the United States all such securities are ordinarily purchasable in the
market, and the rule is settled by the weight of authority that contracts
concerning stocks and bonds of corporations, like those concerning govern-
ment securities, will not be specifically enforced. Specific performance is,
however, frequently decreed where the contract involves corporate stock of a
peculiar or special value to the complainant, or where the subject of the
contract is of unknown and of not easily ascertainable value, or where other
sufficient grounds are present for the interposition of equity.
J. POMEROY, supra note 7 1, at § 1402.
76 See notes 20- 22 and accompanying text supra.
77 See notes 27-35 and accompanying text supra.
78 See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
79 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
so See note 6 supra.
81 See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
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ment a2 is as easily satisfied by the holder of a convertible deben-
ture. Previous discussion pointed out that most legislatures and
courts have been inclined to construe the word shareholder very
broadly.8 3 This history of broad construction may be helpful in
deciding whether convertible debenture holders possess the re-
quisite interest in the stock of the corporation.
One policy behind the shareholder requirement is to insure that
the plaintiff has an interest in the outcome of the litigation.
a4
Because a shareholder owns a share of the corporate assets, his
interest is obvious and he is allowed to sue to protect this pro-
prietary interest if the management of the corporation refuses to
do so. Likewise, the holder of a convertible debenture has a
substantial interest in the value of the corporate stock. He has in
effect made two investments. a5 He has purchased a senior secur-
ity with a fixed income return, and he has purchased the right to
convert the debenture into stock of the corporation at a set
price.8 6 He can obtain an adequate remedy for injury to some of
the incidents of his investment.8 7 However, the value of this right
to convert is directly proportional to the value of the stock. If the
value of the stock falls because of some injury done to the corpo-
ration, the value of the convertible debenture falls as well. The
stockholder would have the right to bring a stockholder's deriva-
tive action to protect his interest if the management of the corpo-
ration refused to bring an action. The convertible debenture hold-
er like a shareholder is vitally interested in the value of the
corporation's stock. Like a shareholder, he too should be able to
bring a derivative action, for his rights as a creditor will not
protect his interest in the value of the stock. As was discussed
82 See notes 44-57 and accompanying text supra.
83 See notes 46-57 and accompanying text supra.
84Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956); Entel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129,
131 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942). To be sure,
the shareholder requirement also has a basis in the theory of corporate law. Conceptually
the stockholder's derivative action is a procedural device enabling the owners of a corpo-
ration to enforce causes of action belonging to the corporation. If the derivative action is
viewed simply as a means for the owner to protect his proprietary interest, then it might be
argued that the holder of a convertible deventure, not being an owner of the corporation,
should not be allowed to bring the suit. It is true that stockholders have certain
rights-liquidation rights, dividend participation rights, and usually voting rights-which
are not possessed by the convertible debenture holder. As a practical matter, however, the
derivative suit is brought to protect not these perquisites of ownership but rather the value
of the shareholder's investment. The holder of a convertible debenture has made an
analogous investment (see notes 85-86 and accompanying text infra), and because of his
interest in the value of the corporation's stock he may be as concerned as the stockholder
in seeing that corporate causes of action are enforced.
8 Katzin, supra note 1, at 361.
8 See note 3 supra.
8
7 See notes 91-98 and accompanying text infra.
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earlier, a personal cause of action may be impossible."" Selling the
convertible debenture is no remedy since its value may have
declined because of the injury done to the corporation. It appears
that the same policies which weighed in favor of allowing the
stockholder to bring a derivative action should apply here.
Thus, a holder of a convertible debenture may be as vitally
interested in the proper management of corporate assets as any
true stockholder or equitable owner whose right to bring such an
action has been recognized. Also it has been shown that many
corporations issue convertible debentures to raise equity capital
rather than to make the debenture more marketable. 9 Thus, most
corporations probably view the convertible debenture as a means
of obtaining common-stock or equity investment. It would seem
appropriate to encourage equity investment of this type by provid-
ing adequate protection to the investors in the form of a right to
bring a stockholder's derivative action.
It may seem unfair to give the holder of a convertible debenture
both the protection of a creditor and the protection of an equity
investor. This particular investor has, however, paid for two
different investments9 The fact that both types of investments
are combined into one package called a convertible debenture
should not affect the availability of protective devices appropriate
to each form of investment.9 1 As long as the investor has con-
tracted for both types of investment and has expectation and
reliance interests in each accordingly, it would follow that the
necessary protections should be provided for both. Arguably the
investor has assumed the risk of economic, business, and market
uncertainties; however no investor should be deemed to have
assumed the risk of actionable mismanagement. Thus all investors
who have vital financial interests in the value of the corporation's
stock should be considered shareholders and thus capable of
bringing a derivative action.
It is important to note that it is the convertibility option of the
88 Sullivan, supra note 16, at 584. In cases where the harm is based upon a wrong to the
incorporated entity as a whole (quite often a breach of some duty to the corporation), no
personal cause of action is possible. A personal cause of action will only be allowed when
the harm is a direct injury to the shareholder's individual right, i.e., breach of his member-
ship contract.
89 Pelcher, Raising Capital with Convertible Securities, 12 MICH. Bus. STUDIES No. 2
(1955).
9°The cost of the convertibility privilege is the difference in interest payments between
a straight debenture and a convertible debenture. See note 2 supra.
91 Even if the convertible debenture is not a separable investment, it is clear that the
convertible debenture holder who receives a smaller return than a straight bond- or
noteholder has a vital interest in the stock of the corporation which bond- and noteholders
in general do not share.
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convertible debenture which justifies the remedy of a stock-
holder's derivative action. To illustrate this, it is instructive to
analyze the ordinary bondholder's investment to determine if he
has an interest sufficient to allow him to bring a derivative action.
Initially there is a question as to whether the bondholder is even
injured by a failure of management to enforce a corporate cause of
action. As long as there exist sufficient corporate resources to pay
the debenture holder his periodic interest payments and his princi-
pal at date of maturity he has not been harmed at all. In contrast,
owners of corporate common stock and of rights convertible into
common stock have been injured immediately if management
refuses to enforce a corporate cause of action. This injury consists
not only of the diminution of the corporate assets, of which they
are owners, but also of the decline in the market value of their
stock or stock rights.
The bondholder may be indirectly hurt by management's refus-
al to bring a corporate cause of action if the injury to the corpo-
ration jeopardizes the required interest payments and principal
repayment. An equitable remedy, though, such as a stockholder's
derivative action, is neither necessary nor suitable for such an
injury, for the bondholder has other legal and equitable remedies
which adequately protect him. Should a corporation default when
a payment is due, the bondholder has an action against the corpo-
ration based upon rights provided him by the law of contracts and
of negotiable instruments. 92 Protection for the bondholder prior to
forfeiture can be provided by the terms of an indenture agree-
ment.93 The agreement might limit the corporation in a number of
ways in order to provide protection against possible default in-
cluding limiting corporate borrowing, imposing a liabilities-to-as-
sets margin requirement, limiting dividend payments, restricting
share redemption or purchase, requiring the continuation of spe-
cific reserves, or limiting the amount of additional securities is-
92 See note 4 supra.
93 The indenture (often called a trust agreement or deed of trust) is a contract between
the issuer and a trustee for the bondholders. The trustee, who is usually a financial
institution, represents the numerous bondholders under a particular security issue. In-
dentures are subject to the particular requirements of the Federal Trust Indenture Act of
1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq. (1970). This Act requires that bonds, debentures, notes,
and other debt securities, other than particularly exempted securities, which are offered to
the public through the mail or interstate commerce be secured by a qualified indenture. To
be qualified, the indenture must provide for an independent institutional trustee, which is
subject to affirmative duties to protect the indenture security holder. Certain exculpatory
provisions, which formerly limited the trustee's liability, are now prohibited. See also
Garret, A Borrower's View of the Model Corporate Debenture Indenture Provisions, 21




sued. 94 If a potential bond purchaser did not find the provisions of
a specific indenture agreement protective enough, he might have
available the additional creditor protection of a mortgage bond, a
bond of higher security of principal than a debenture. 5
There is a great deal of disagreement among the various states
as to whether the officers of the corporation are liable to creditors
for an injury primarily to the corporation. 96 Where corporate
mismanagement has resulted in the corporation's default on a
payment, many states will allow a creditor to bring a creditor's bill
on behalf of the corporation against corporate officers if the cor-
poration has become insolvent through negligent management.
9 7
If a corporation is solvent, there is no need to resort to the
individual liability of officers. In many jurisdictions, to protect
creditors to an even greater extent legislatures have enacted stat-
utes which make directors, trustees, and officers personally liable
for corporate debts if they have acted negligently.9 8
IV. CONCLUSION
There are sound economic and public policy reasons for clas-
sifying the holder of a convertible debenture as a stockholder for
purposes of bringing a stockholder's derivative action. The con-
vertible debenture holder is an investor who has a substantial
financial interest in the value of the corporation's stock. Since part
of his investment represents the right to convert into common
94See Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., II F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935),
rev'd, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936); Sass v. New York Towers, Ltd., 23 App. Div. 2d 105,
258 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1965). See also H. HENN, supra note 4, § 156, at 283-84.
95 A mortgage bond is secured by a mortgage or lien on property of the issuing
corporation. Thus first mortgage bonds are usually the senior issue and would have
preferred creditor status. H. HENN, supra note 4, § 156, at 281.
96W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, at § 1180.
97 The theory behind such a cause of action is that the right of the corporation to sue is a
chose in action and therefore an equitable asset, which can be reached by a creditor's bill.
See, e.g., A.B. Gochenour v. George & Francis Ball Foundation, 35 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.
Ind. 1940), aff'd, 117 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941); Michelsen v.
Penney, 10 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Pritchard v. Myers, 174 Md. 66, 197 A. 620
(1938); Pennsylvania Bank v. Hopkins, Ill Pa. 328, 2 A. 83 (1886).
98 A detailed description of the different types of statutes is impractical because of the
great variety among jurisdictions. Generally the statutory scheme will incorporate one or
more of the following remedial approaches:
(1) statutes creating liability where statutory conditions precedent to the right to do
business have not been complied with or where all or a certain part of the stock has not
been subscribed for or paid in;
(2) statutes providing that the violation of any of the provisions of the incorporation act,
or of certain preceeding sections of the act, shall make directors or other officers person-
ally liable;
(3) statutes making officers liable to creditors, or creditors and others, for negligence or
other breach of duty;
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stock, the corporation usually views him as a contributor to equity
capital. Since his creditor status in terms of the debenture does
not protect him from injury to the corporation which substantially
damages the value of his convertible right, it is essential that law
or equity provide some alternative protection. The right to bring a
stockholder's derivative action would provide adequate protection
and further serve the important public policy of encouraging capi-
tal contribution through convertible debentures. Moreover, what
case law there is seems to support this position.
Strike suits, purchased litigation, and collusive invocation of
diversity jurisdiction are all possible dangers inherent in deriva-
tive actions, but they are easily avoided in suits brought by
holders of convertible debentures by the same devices used to
prevent these dangers in the usual shareholder's derivative suit.
While there seems to be no need to extend the availability of the
derivative action to ordinary bondholders and other creditors of
the corporation, it is an appropriate remedy for holders of con-
vertible debentures.
-Robert A. Malstrom
(4) statutes creating personal liability where the debts exceed a certain amount;
(5) statutes making directors and other officers personally liable where they pay a
dividend wrongfully;
(6) statutes making officers personally liable for failure to file annual reports; and
(7) statutes making corporate officers personally liable for false reports, certificates,
statements, notices, or the like.
W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, at § 1200. See also National Refractories Co. v. Bay State
Builders' Supply Co., 334 Mass. 541, 137 N.E.2d 221 (1956).
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